From 3c4f7647b9a8117398414bc62c84d2891ff97f54 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Craig Jennings <c@cjennings.net>
Date: Wed, 24 Jun 2026 00:15:25 -0400
Subject: feat(archsetup): harden sshd with a prohibit-password drop-in

The installer now writes /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/10-hardening.conf with PermitRootLogin prohibit-password and reloads sshd, right after it starts the service. Root can still log in by key, never by password. PasswordAuthentication is left at the default so a normal user can bootstrap a key with ssh-copy-id.

This makes the posture intentional instead of leaning on Arch's commented default. velox and ratio both carried an explicit PermitRootLogin yes from earlier provisioning, which I'd already fixed by hand.
---
 archsetup | 8 ++++++++
 todo.org  | 5 +++--
 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/archsetup b/archsetup
index 68ae5b8..4d70f06 100755
--- a/archsetup
+++ b/archsetup
@@ -1268,6 +1268,14 @@ EOF
     action="starting the openssh service" && display "task" "$action"
     systemctl start sshd >> "$logfile" 2>&1   || error_warn "$action" "$?"
 
+    action="hardening sshd (root login by key only)" && display "task" "$action"
+    cat << 'EOF' > /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/10-hardening.conf
+# Root may log in by key only, never by password. PasswordAuthentication is
+# left at the default so a normal user can still bootstrap a key via ssh-copy-id.
+PermitRootLogin prohibit-password
+EOF
+    systemctl reload sshd >> "$logfile" 2>&1 || error_warn "$action" "$?"
+
     # SSH Brute Force Protection
 
     display "subtitle" "SSH Brute Force Protection"
diff --git a/todo.org b/todo.org
index 89ec5b9..38b41a8 100644
--- a/todo.org
+++ b/todo.org
@@ -634,8 +634,9 @@ One real integrity bypass exists, and it is not =--noconfirm=: =archsetup:2403=
 :END:
 Ensure new tools integrate with DWM environment and don't break workflow
 
-** TODO [#C] Harden sshd in the installer (explicit prohibit-password) :solo:
-Fresh installs already get Arch's safe default (=PermitRootLogin prohibit-password= is the commented stock value) and archsetup doesn't set it — but velox and ratio both carried an explicit =PermitRootLogin yes= at =/etc/ssh/sshd_config:33= from some earlier provisioning, fixed by hand 2026-06-23 (root is now key-only on both; =PasswordAuthentication= left on so ssh-copy-id to the user still works). Make the posture intentional rather than dependent on the upstream default: in the openssh block (=archsetup= ~1265, after =systemctl enable sshd=), write =/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/10-hardening.conf= with =PermitRootLogin prohibit-password=. Leave =PasswordAuthentication= alone. Surfaced by the 2026-06-23 security-status work.
+** DONE [#C] Harden sshd in the installer (explicit prohibit-password) :solo:
+CLOSED: [2026-06-24 Wed]
+Done 2026-06-24: the openssh block (=archsetup:1271-1277=) now writes =/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/10-hardening.conf= with =PermitRootLogin prohibit-password= and reloads sshd, right after starting the service. =PasswordAuthentication= left untouched so ssh-copy-id to the user still works. Makes the posture intentional rather than dependent on the upstream default. Velox and ratio (which carried an explicit =PermitRootLogin yes= at =sshd_config:33= from earlier provisioning) were already fixed by hand 2026-06-23. Verified =bash -n= + =shellcheck -S error= clean; full drop-in-on-fresh-install confirmation is VM-deferred (the unit harness covers helpers, not inline install steps).
 
 ** TODO [#B] Add NVIDIA preflight check for Hyprland
 :PROPERTIES:
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