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#!/usr/bin/env bats
# Tests for the secret-scan block shared by the elisp, bash, and go pre-commit
# hooks. The block greps added lines in the staged diff for credential
# patterns; a hit blocks the commit (exit 1), a clean scan falls through to the
# variant's language check (exit 0).
#
# Every case stages a .txt file, so the language checks that follow the scan
# (check-parens, shellcheck, gofmt) all skip and the scan is what's under test.
#
# The two boundary cases exist because of a live false-positive in a downstream
# project: an embedded PNG sprite data URI blocked a real commit and forced
# --no-verify. Root cause was `grep -iE` applying case-insensitivity to the
# fixed-case AWS token AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}, so any mixed-case 20-char run inside a
# random base64 blob matched. Measured at ~6% of 100KB blobs; case-sensitive
# matching drops it to 0 across ~10MB.
VARIANTS="elisp bash go"
setup() {
REPO="$(mktemp -d)"
cd "$REPO" || return 1
git init -q .
git config user.email t@example.com
git config user.name Test
}
teardown() {
cd /tmp || true
[ -n "${REPO:-}" ] && rm -rf "$REPO"
}
# Stage $2 as the content of file $1 (default staged.txt).
stage() {
local file="${2:-staged.txt}"
printf '%s\n' "$1" > "$file"
git add "$file"
}
# Run a variant's hook in the temp repo. $1 = variant name.
run_hook() {
bash "${BATS_TEST_DIRNAME}/../../languages/$1/githooks/pre-commit"
}
# ---- Normal: real secrets still block, clean content still passes ----
@test "secret-scan: clean content passes in every variant" {
stage 'const greeting = "hello world";'
for v in $VARIANTS; do
run run_hook "$v"
[ "$status" -eq 0 ] || { echo "$v blocked clean content: $output"; return 1; }
done
}
@test "secret-scan: a real uppercase AWS access key blocks in every variant" {
stage 'aws_key = "AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE"'
for v in $VARIANTS; do
run run_hook "$v"
[ "$status" -eq 1 ] || { echo "$v missed an AWS key"; return 1; }
[[ "$output" == *"potential secret"* ]]
done
}
@test "secret-scan: a keyword=value credential blocks in every variant" {
stage 'api_key: "sk_live_9f3b2a7c1e4d8f0a6b5"'
for v in $VARIANTS; do
run run_hook "$v"
[ "$status" -eq 1 ] || { echo "$v missed an api_key assignment"; return 1; }
done
}
@test "secret-scan: a PEM private-key header blocks in every variant" {
stage '-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----'
for v in $VARIANTS; do
run run_hook "$v"
[ "$status" -eq 1 ] || { echo "$v missed a PEM header"; return 1; }
done
}
# ---- Boundary: the case-sensitivity fix ----
@test "secret-scan: a lowercase akia-like run does not block (AWS keys are uppercase)" {
# Under `grep -iE` this matched the AKIA token and blocked a legitimate commit.
stage 'const blob = "akiaiosfodnn7examplexyz";'
for v in $VARIANTS; do
run run_hook "$v"
[ "$status" -eq 0 ] || { echo "$v false-positived on a lowercase run: $output"; return 1; }
done
}
@test "secret-scan: an embedded base64 data URI carrying a mixed-case akia run does not block" {
# The live failure: a sprite blob whose random base64 contained a mixed-case
# 20-char run. Case-sensitive matching is what clears it.
stage 'const SPRITE = "";'
for v in $VARIANTS; do
run run_hook "$v"
[ "$status" -eq 0 ] || { echo "$v false-positived on a sprite data URI: $output"; return 1; }
done
}
# ---- Boundary: the scan must not go blind on data-URI lines ----
@test "secret-scan: a real credential sharing a line with a base64 data URI still blocks" {
# Minified bundles put a whole file on one line, so a data URI and a real key
# can share it. Skipping any line containing ';base64,' would hide the key.
stage 'const S="";const c={api_key:"sk_live_9f3b2a7c1e4d8f0a6b5"};'
for v in $VARIANTS; do
run run_hook "$v"
[ "$status" -eq 1 ] || { echo "$v went blind on a data-URI line and missed the key"; return 1; }
done
}
@test "secret-scan: a line matching both passes is reported once, not twice" {
# The scan runs a case-sensitive and a case-insensitive pass. A line carrying
# both an AWS key and a keyword=value credential hits both; reporting it twice
# reads as two separate leaks.
stage 'api_key = "AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE_padding"'
for v in $VARIANTS; do
run run_hook "$v"
[ "$status" -eq 1 ]
hits="$(printf '%s\n' "$output" | grep -c 'AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE_padding')"
[ "$hits" -eq 1 ] || { echo "$v reported the line $hits times, want 1"; return 1; }
done
}
# ---- Error / edge ----
@test "secret-scan: an empty staged diff passes" {
for v in $VARIANTS; do
run run_hook "$v"
[ "$status" -eq 0 ] || { echo "$v failed on an empty diff: $output"; return 1; }
done
}
@test "secret-scan: a secret only on a removed line does not block" {
# The scan reads added lines. Deleting a key should never block the deletion.
stage 'aws_key = "AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE"'
git commit -qm "seed" --no-verify
printf 'clean\n' > staged.txt
git add staged.txt
for v in $VARIANTS; do
run run_hook "$v"
[ "$status" -eq 0 ] || { echo "$v blocked a removal: $output"; return 1; }
done
}
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